

~~SECRET~~

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Reply to DOE's DAS Walsh on NIO/CT

FROM:

Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman, NIC

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC #00970-89

DATE

19 September 1989

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

ER

20 SEP 1989

2.

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DDCI

9/21

9/21

for signature

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Fritz W. Ermarth  
C/NIC 7E47 OHB

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→ Please tell  
Oehler  
was signed

DCI  
EXEC  
REG~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00970-89  
19 September 1989


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Reply to DOE's DAS Walsh on NIO/CT

During your absence on leave, a letter (TAB B) arrived from Mr. Walsh protesting the planning amalgamation of accounts. I promptly called Steve Barker to give an interim oral reply, basically explaining why our plans made sense even for DOE. As it turned out, Walsh was also on leave; Barker had drafted and written the letter in his name. My points to him were reassuring, and from all I could gather, entirely acceptable.

I suggest a reply to Mr. Walsh, however, just to close the loop. A draft is proposed at TAB A.

  
Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: C/CTC  
NIO/CT  
NIO/STP

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25X1

A

B

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
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SUSPENSE		14 Sep 89 Date			

Remarks

To # 9: Please have response prepared  
for DDCI signature.

ER 2589/1 89

  
Executive Secretary

24 Aug '89

Date

3637 (10-81)

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**(This cover sheet is unclassified.)**

# **CONFIDENTIAL**

705-101  
NSN 7540-01-213-7903

Exception Granted by GSA (9/88)

**STANDARD FORM 705 (8-85)**  
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO  
32 CFR 2003



# Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

ER 89-2589/1

AUG 22 1989

Mr. Richard J. Kerr  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Room 7D60  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Kerr:

I have been informed that there is consideration being given to eliminating the position of the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism (NIO/CT).

On behalf of the Department of Energy (DOE), I wish to convey to you our concern regarding the impact of such an action on this Department.

Aside from the traditional role in managing estimative and interagency intelligence production relating to terrorism, the NIO/CT has served as an invaluable point-of-contact between the Intelligence Community and the Department in ensuring that DOE's analytic needs are addressed.

The NIO/CT has been especially useful in assisting us in articulating to the Intelligence Community the types of information DOE's intelligence infrastructure requires in assuring the security of our nuclear weapons complex. To act as a facilitator in communicating consumer needs in an arena as complex as terrorism is a difficult task. The Community has made outstanding progress in amassing and making available information for counterterrorist operations; much work remains, however, in ensuring concomitant progress in the area of anti-terrorism, i.e., sufficient information for the design and implementation of robust protection systems.

We believe that it is critical that the NIO/CT position be retained to insure that issues such as this receive continuing high-level attention within the Intelligence Community.

Your favorable consideration of this matter would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

*Robert J. Walsh*  
Robert J. Walsh  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Intelligence  
Defense Programs

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized disclosure

Derivative Classification

Director, OTA

OADR

Multiple

(Guide or Source Document)

Declassify on:

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(Guide or Source Document)

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NSN 7540-01-213-7902

STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85)  
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32 CFR 2003



**SECRET**This document consists of 2 pages**Department of Energy**

Washington, DC 20585

No. 1 of 3 copies, Series A

August 23, 1989

*Doc 11  
I sacked this on as  
an example of CTC-DOE  
cooperation in the past.  
Jef*

[redacted]  
Chief, Counterterrorism Center  
Room 6F39  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Fred:

In August 1988, [redacted] met with Bob Walsh, DOE's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, and me to discuss the mechanics of CIA's dissemination process and to advise us on what DOE's Office of Threat Assessment needed to do to optimize the amount of terrorism-related products made available to the Department. Among other things, Joe suggested it would be of help to him if we flagged products we found particularly useful and communicated this to you.

Although CIA has disseminated a number of very useful products to us of the type Joe had alluded to, I have not had a chance to address them individually.

[redacted] I thought this would be a good one to flag.

One of the questions facing DOE Headquarters management charged with protecting our nuclear-related assets, i.e., the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and evaluating protective force effectiveness, i.e., the Office of Security Evaluations (OSE), is the nature of training being given transnational terrorists.

Those charged with these responsibilities recognize that prudent security planning, the cornerstone in either deterring or managing terrorist acts, cannot be done in a vacuum. Smart planning requires information about the potential adversary: their capabilities (training, weapons, equipment, and levels of sophistication), their tactics and modes of operation, their activities, infrastructures, motivations, etc. Such information is developed

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized disclosure is prohibited. Derivative Classification [redacted] Active sanctions

Director, OTA

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-2-

[redacted]  
So far, such groups are undertaking acts outside the US. Should terrorist acts--domestic or international--commence within the US, it is imperative that DOE's security system is sufficiently robust to discourage terrorists from deciding to hit one or another elements of our nuclear complex.

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The Department cannot afford the luxury of waiting for attacks against DOE assets to finally evolve an effective protection posture.

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[redacted]  
The types of weapons, training, and other capabilities possessed by our protective forces, for example, must be such that they are adequate in deterring those adversaries currently carrying out attacks in other parts of the world.

The information contained [redacted] was of great value in this regard, at

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] was passed to both OSS and OSE; it was much appreciated.

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Please pass along our thanks to Joe and his team.

My fellow briefing seminar-mates and I appreciated your briefing at the DIAC Counterterrorism Perspectives Seminar in July. It was tremendously useful. I look forward to getting together with you to explore some of the issues we discussed after the presentation.

Sincerely,



Linnea P. Raine  
Senior Foreign Intelligence Analyst  
Office of Threat Assessment  
Defense Programs

cc: CIA/DDI/NIO/CT

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25X1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE			
TO: C/NIC					
ROOM NO.		BUILDING			
REMARKS:					
FROM: ER					
ROOM NO.		BUILDING		EXTENSION	

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 2589/3 89

21 September 1989

Mr. Robert J. Walsh  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence  
Defense Programs  
Department of Energy

  
~~Dear~~ Mr. Walsh:

Your letter of 22 August concerning our plans to move the responsibilities of the NIO for Counterterrorism into the DCI's Counterterrorism Center arrived while I was on annual leave. In an initial response, Fritz Ermarth, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, called your assistant Steve Barker to explain the rationale for this move and the state of play.

As the DCI's memo to NFIB and NFIC principals explains, the main reason for this move is to put the very important Community activities concerning terrorism, and also counterintelligence, directly into the Centers to which the DCI primarily looks for support and action on his responsibilities in these vital areas. Having Centers and NIOs with somewhat overlapping responsibilities but different chains of command and, to some extent, constituencies, has, in the past, led to confusion and occasional friction. This is why, when setting up the Counternarcotics Center, the Judge decided to put Community activities right in the Center from the start.

I share the confidence of the Judge and others at Headquarters that this move will strengthen Community cooperation on counterterrorism and the other affected accounts. At the same time, we are very aware of the concerns of DOE and other elements of the Community and are determined to meet them through close consultation and steady effort.

NIOs and the National Intelligence Council will continue, with the support of CTC and NFIB agencies, to have responsibility for preparing national estimates on terrorism. Various regional and functional NIOs will maintain watching

CL BY      SIGNER  
DECL      OADR

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briefs over the Community affairs which have been transferred to the different Centers. Given the highly technical nature of DOE's concerns about terrorism, I have instructed Gordon Oehler, NIO for Science, Technology, and Proliferation, to be the NIC's lookout for them. This should in no way detract from the close cooperation we expect between your office and the Counterterrorism Center.

Thank you for your letter and please don't hesitate to be in further touch.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a thin black border, used to redact the signature of Richard J. Kerr.

Richard J. Kerr

25X1

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17					
18					
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20					
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	14 Sep 89 Date		

## Remarks

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ER 2589/1 89

*XLS*  
Executive Secretary  
24 Aug '89  
Date

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